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Air Force Funded 430 Small-Business Research Bids Flagged for Foreign Risk, Denying 39, GAO Finds

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WASHINGTON — The Air Force awarded 430 small-business research proposals that its reviewers had flagged for possible foreign risk in fiscal 2024 and 2025 and denied 39, while the National Institutes of Health rejected all 382 of its flagged proposals, the Government Accountability Office said in a report released Thursday.

The 33-page report, “Small Business Research Programs: Selected Agencies Address Foreign Risks and Take Various Approaches to Track Data” (GAO-27-108923), examines how five agencies screen applicants to the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. In fiscal 2024, 11 participating agencies issued more than 6,400 awards worth about $4.3 billion, according to the report.

Across the Air Force, NIH, the Energy Department, NASA and the National Science Foundation, agencies received 53,051 proposals over the two years and ran due-diligence checks on 28,162 of them. They flagged 1,712 proposals for possible foreign ownership or employee-affiliation risks. Of those, they awarded 740, with or without conditions, and denied 451, GAO found.

GAO counts a “flag” as any possible risk an agency identified during review. A flag is not a finding of wrongdoing.

One agency awards, another denies

The Air Force received nearly half of all proposals, 21,067, and screened every one. It flagged 185 for foreign-ownership risk and 454 for employee-affiliation risk, about 43% and 32% of those flags across the five agencies. Of the Air Force proposals flagged for foreign risk, it awarded 415 with no mitigation, awarded 15 with conditions and denied 39, according to the report.

NIH takes the opposite approach. “NIH mitigates foreign risk by denying the award,” the report says. The agency denied all 382 proposals it flagged for foreign risk during the period. NIH officials told GAO that denied applicants may reapply in later cycles and that some have lowered their risk level using the agency’s guidance.

The Air Force, Energy, NASA and NSF can instead attach conditions to an award. Examples GAO listed include barring a company from using hardware from a specific foreign company, prohibiting named employees from co-authoring papers with people in a “foreign country of concern,” removing a risky researcher from a project, and requiring written promises not to share technology with a foreign country.

Examples from the files

GAO reviewed six or seven fiscal 2025 proposals from each agency and described several cases without naming the companies.

In one Air Force case, the founder of a heat-sensor company’s parent firm graduated from a university in China. The parent company had reduced its stake but kept about 30% ownership. The Air Force awarded the proposal without mitigation. In another, a manager had education, employment and co-authorship ties to entities in a foreign country of concern, “some of which were undisclosed.” The Air Force made that award with mitigation.

The Energy Department denied a computer engineering company whose two principal investigators had numerous co-authorships with “a researcher who is currently a professor at a university in China that is on multiple U.S. restricted party lists.” NIH denied an adaptive-apparel company that kept an affiliated business and employees in China it did not properly disclose, and a drug developer whose key personnel had undisclosed ties to Chinese companies and universities.

NSF awarded a company whose employee had published with international co-authors “with suspected ties to a foreign malign talent recruitment program.” GAO said those ties were not disclosed but “did not present a research security issue.”

Gaps at NSF

NSF told GAO it had no standardized way to collect data on foreign risks in fiscal 2024 or 2025. In fiscal 2024, program directors tracked due-diligence work individually, for example in “saved emails or a local spreadsheet,” the report says. NSF also used no commercial risk-assessment tools for foreign ownership in those years, and its research security office reviewed only Phase II proposals.

The agency told GAO it has since finalized a risk matrix and operating procedures, with an internal database still pending as of July 20, 2026, and plans to have its research security office review all proposals.

No new recommendations

The report is the fourth GAO review required by the SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022, which made agencies screen applicants for foreign ownership, employee affiliations, patents and cybersecurity. GAO made no new recommendations. In January 2026, it made 26 recommendations to 11 agencies, and it says 10 agencies are working to carry them out.

The Defense Department, HHS and the Small Business Administration provided technical comments, according to the report. Energy, NASA and NSF had no comments. GAO addressed the report to the Senate and House Armed Services committees, the Senate and House small business committees and the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee.

The programs lapsed from Oct. 1, 2025, to April 13, 2026, when Congress reauthorized them in the Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act. That law expanded the screening areas, and GAO says it plans to examine the changes in future reports.

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