Immigration Appeals Board Reinstates Deportation Case, Rules Reckless Assault Causing 'Moderate' Injury Is a Crime of Moral Turpitude
The Board of Immigration Appeals on Tuesday reinstated deportation proceedings against a man from the Philippines who was admitted to the United States in 2020, ruling in a precedent decision that a South Carolina conviction for second-degree assault and battery is a "crime involving moral turpitude" under federal immigration law.
The decision, Matter of Mercader, 30 I&N Dec. 185, vacates an immigration judge's June 2025 ruling that had ended the case. Under federal regulations, Board decisions are binding on DHS officers and immigration judges, and those designated as precedents apply "in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues," so immigration judges nationwide must now treat the South Carolina offense this way.
What the Immigration Board Decided
According to the decision, the man was admitted to the United States on March 1, 2020, "as a child of an alien resident." On Feb. 11, 2025, he was convicted of assault and battery in the second degree under South Carolina law. The Department of Homeland Security then charged him as removable for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after admission and punishable by a year or more in prison. The South Carolina offense carries a maximum of three years, the decision notes.
The immigration judge granted his motion to terminate the case, finding DHS had not shown the conviction qualified. DHS appealed. A three-member panel, Appellate Immigration Judges Hunsucker and Gemoets and Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Picos, sustained the appeal in an opinion written by Gemoets and sent the case back to the immigration judge "for the entry of a new decision."
The Board also rejected the man's argument that DHS filed its appeal too late, finding the 30-day clock ran from the judge's written order on June 6, 2025, not from a June 2 hearing.
Why 'Moderate Bodily Injury' Mattered
South Carolina's statute covers injuring someone when "moderate bodily injury" results or could have resulted, or when the act involves nonconsensual touching of a person's private parts. State law defines moderate bodily injury to include prolonged loss of consciousness, temporary or moderate disfigurement, temporary loss of an organ's function, or a fracture or dislocation.
The immigration judge had found that moderate injury did not rise to the level of serious bodily injury the Board usually requires. The Board disagreed. It wrote that "actual infliction of serious bodily injury is not a requirement" and that the actual or attempted infliction of moderate injury "is a base act that transgresses the socially accepted rules of morality."
The Board noted that a simple assault is generally not a crime of moral turpitude, but said an "aggravating factor" can change that. It found that recklessness, the lowest mental state the Board concluded the statute requires, combined with the risk of moderate injury is enough. The decision cites the South Carolina Supreme Court's 2024 ruling that some offenses under the statute can be committed recklessly.
The Board found the second part of the statute, covering nonconsensual touching, also qualifies, writing that it "has long considered nonconsensual sexual conduct to be morally reprehensible." Because both parts qualify, it did not matter that the record did not show which part the man was convicted under.
What the Decision Sets Aside
The immigration judge had pointed out that the man was not convicted of a greater offense and that his conviction record was marked "non-violent." The Board said that "the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the sentence imposed is not determinative" of whether an offense involves moral turpitude.
The decision addresses only whether the conviction makes the man removable. The case now returns to the immigration judge for further proceedings. The decision does not say whether he has applied for any relief from removal.
Sources: Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of Mercader, 30 I&N Dec. 185 (BIA 2026), decided Oct. 27, 2026: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1468861/dl?inline ; EOIR, Board of Immigration Appeals precedent decisions, Volume 30: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-30 ; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (Board decisions as precedents): https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-8/chapter-V/subchapter-A/part-1003/subpart-A/section-1003.1




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